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Educational freedom is consistent with rival social policies, those seeking to promote 
individual development (liberalism) as well as those concerned about the perpetuation of 
freely-chosen communities within the civil society (communitarianism). What it cannot 
be reconciled with is a state monopoly on the formation of the loyalties of youth and their 
perspective on how and to what ends to live their lives. Totalitarian regimes seek to 
achieve such a monopoly;1 but pluralistic democracies recognize that there is no freedom 
more basic than that of seeking to shape the beliefs and convictions of one’s children. On 
the other hand, as Montesquieu pointed out in The Spirit of the Laws, 
 
It is in republican government that the full power of education is needed. 
. . . One can define this virtue as love of the laws and the homeland. This love, 
requiring a continual preference of the public interest over one’s own, produces all 
the individual virtues; they are only that preference....in a republic, everything 
depends on establishing this love, and education should attend to inspiring it.2 
 
Thus, education for citizenship is a crucial concern for free societies, even as their 







commitment to freedom places restraints on what they may legitimately do to control and 
direct such education. Some of the variations on this theme are discussed in the chapter, 
in this volume, “Teaching values in schools?” 
 
The focus of the present chapter is on one of the dimensions along which political tensions 
and attempted policy solutions are most likely to fall, religious differences within a society 
and the demands which they make upon the educational system. The following chapter 
will deal with the parallel and often overlapping dimension of culture. It is important to 
note that there is a third and very significant dimension, that of social class and 
educational outcomes, but to discuss this would be beyond the scope of the information 
brought together in these volumes.3 
 
 
Brief historical overview 
 
Conflicts over the place of religion in education characterized the period from 1790 to 
1914 when modern educational systems took shape, and have occasionally resurfaced in 
more recent decades. A notable feature of contemporary educational policy in most 
Western democracies, however, is that  religious  differences have generally been 
accommodated. Beginning in the 1970s for three decades, conflicts over education in 
Europe were more likely to arise from cultural than from religious differences, or from 
religious differences understood by elites to be essentially cultural. This perception was 
no doubt related to the secularist conviction that religion was essentially a phenomenon 
of the past, combined with the stark contrast between the customs of many of the families 
who followed the labor immigration of the post-war period and those prevalent in the host 
societies. It was only, as we will see, as the second and third generations deriving from 
that immigration came to maturity, largely abandoning their ancestral cultures but 
turning to Islam in ways that, for many of them, was more fervent than the practice of 
their parents, that religion re-emerged as the predominant source of conflict. 
 
The great exception to the temporary eclipse of religion as a source of conflict, of course, 
was the massive mobilization of parents of pupils in Catholic schools, in 1984, against 
governmental attempts in France and Spain to increase controls over these schools; it is 
hard to know to what extent religious motivations played a role in this widespread 
resistance. For a brief account, and references, see the chapter: “State and Schools: An 
Historical Overview.” 
 
The general armistice in conflicts over religion and education did not mean that the rights 
of religious minorities were over the course of the twentieth century in all cases 
adequately protected in the education sphere. In some countries, notably the United 
States, those parents who wish to ensure that their children receive an education informed 
by their religious convictions must pay for private schooling in addition to the taxes that 
they pay to support unused public schools; parents with insufficient resources are as a 
result unable to exercise educational freedom. In other countries, government supports 






voluntary – is provided within the context of the public school program, but may be 
available only to one or two faith-communities in an increasingly-diverse society. For 
these variations, see the country profiles, and “Teaching Values in Schools.” 
 
Countries with written constitutions, at least among Western democracies, commonly 
provide an explicit commitment to freedom of religion within an essentially secular state. 
Modern states, aside from those still under Communist rule, are seldom defined as 
“atheist” or in any sense hostile to religion. On the other hand, apart from the Islamic 
world, it is unusual for a state to have a religious character or to extend official recognition 
to a single religion; among the largely symbolic exceptions are the United Kingdom and 
the Scandinavian countries. Characteristically, a modern state is secular without being 
secularizing, supporting and interacting with all religions which are represented among 
its citizens without extending preferential treatment to any. 
 
The State plays only a limited role in the religious sphere, in Western societies, but creates 
space for religious groups such as churches to be active in accordance with their own self-
defined aims and aspirations and to advance and promote their values and beliefs in a 
spirit of respect for the rights of others. Although it seems likely that this owes more to 
historical developments and the balance of political forces than to the working out of a 
theory, it is often justified in the name of “subsidiarity,” which has recently become one 
of the founding principles of the European Union.4 
 
The classic articulation of this principle is that of Pope Pius XI in 1931: “just as it is gravely 
wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by their own initiative and 
industry and give it to the community, so also it is an injustice and at the same time a 
grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher association what 
lesser and subordinate organizations can do... those in command should be sure that the 
more perfectly a graduated order is preserved among the various associations, in 
observance of the principle of ‘subsidiary function,’ the stronger social authority and 
effectiveness will be, and the happier and more prosperous the condition of the State.”5 
Or, expressed as a program of institutional reform in the words of Catholic philosopher 
Jacques Maritain, “in order both to maintain and make fruitful the movement for social 
improvement supported by the State, and to bring the State back to its true nature, it is 
necessary that many functions now exercised by the State should be distributed among 
the various autonomous organs of a pluralistically structured body politic.”6 
 
Dutch Protestant political thinking has developed the more radical concept of “sphere 
sovereignty” (souvereiniteit in eigen kring), usually associated with 
statesman/theologian Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920). The associations and institutions 
that make up civil society, Kuyper insisted, should not be considered subordinate 
divisions of the state, enjoying only those rights and that scope which the state chooses to 
entrust to them, but possess their own fundamental rights that derive from the purposes 
for which they exist. The role of the state is to mediate among these “spheres,” ensuring 
that justice is done, the rights of individuals are protected, and tasks that can only be 
undertaken by the whole society are carried out. The state must not, however, seek to take 






teachings or practices of religious organizations, to tell business where to invest or how 
to produce, or to interfere in what occurs between teacher and pupils. Government 
touches upon all of those spheres of activity, of course, as it carried out its own mission, 
but it does so as it were from the outside, preventing abuses. The relationship between 
government and the other spheres of social life is thus of an entirely different nature than 
the relationship among levels of government.7 Sphere sovereignty insists upon the right 
of the school–for example–to function by its own rationality and in accordance with its 
own purposes, not those of government or of any other sphere, including that of the family 
or of a religious institution.8 
 
To the extent that citizens are motivated by religious considerations, they have a right to 
have these considerations taken seriously as having profound normative significance, 
indeed as offering a personal identity which deserves respect.9 Religion is not, for most 
people, however, an exclusively private matter; it is exercised through association with 
fellow-believers, and in the “public square”.10 
 
Basic rights are not limited to the rights of individuals in relation to the state. 
People exercise their rights through their participation in the activities of collective 
bodies, often in the context of a philosophy which has been provided with an 
institutionalised setting. Because of their activities, these collective bodies may be 
considered to be working in the public interest, because they assume a role that 
would otherwise have to be filled by the state and its various services. . . . In this 
respect, the time-honored borderline between the public and private fields of 
competence seems to have become blurred. The rights of these collective groups 
and the “socialisation of fundamental rights” have been described in a legal context 
as the “third-generation” of human rights, subsequent to the principles of freedom 
and equality.11 
 
Legal scholar Stephen Carter has pointed out the importance of such a “community of 
meaning: a group of people, voluntarily associated with each other, struggling to make 
sense of the world.”12 
 
European countries have made different choices about how to manage the relationship 
between religious organizations and the State, including strict separation, a concordat 
with the Vatican, or a national church as in England. In other countries the specific 
technique of recognition of religion and state support of churches is used. These 
historically-determined arrangements are facing new tests as they seek to come to terms 
with Islam. As Olivier Roy points out, “in every Western country, Islam is being integrated 
and not following its own traditions but according to the place that each society has 
defined for religion, from Anglo- Saxon indulgence to Gallic suspicion, although the 
former needs to be less naive and the latter less pathological.”13 
 
The equality principle would be violated if material support were awarded to one religious 
confession only, whatever the historical circumstances that produced such an 
arrangement. Some support was originally justified as compensation for the earlier 






Church), but there has been a growing recognition that religious organizations can play a 
valuable role in meeting a variety of human needs that are not strictly religious. Perhaps 
the most striking evidence of this is the position taken recently by philosopher Jürgen 
Habermas, that 
 
[t]he neutrality of the state authority on questions of world views guarantees the 
same ethical freedom to every citizen. This is incompatible with the political 
universalization of a secularist world view. When secularized citizens act in their 
role as citizens of the state, they must not deny in principle that religious images 
of the world have the potential to express truth. Nor must they refuse their 
believing fellow citizens the right to make contributions in a religious language in 
public debates.14 
 
The starting point for such recognition is the social and moral influence of religion on 
citizens and on the society in general. “The ultimate basis for the church’s legal status vis-
à-vis the state,” said a German Catholic leader in 1969, “rests on the fact that the 
pluralistic state has to turn to social groups that establish and preserve values, and this 
the churches are better able to do than other social groups.”15 
 
With some exceptions, in fact, governments rely upon schools with a religious character 
to help to meet the demand for education, and the specific demand of some parents for 
faith-based schooling. 
 
It is the freedom of the human person, not only as a civil liberty but also as a social-
cultural right, that serves as a ‘hinge’ between ecclesiastical doctrine and social politics. 
This liberty is not limited to that religious confession which forms the majority in a 
country, but applies to every group of persons who wish to rally around a specified project 
that is set up ideologically, philosophically, or otherwise, limited only by protection of 
public order and the rights of individuals. 
 
Religious rights are not exercised exclusively in private, however, nor can their exercise 
claim complete immunity from public accountability. It is possible to distinguish several 
distinct dimensions in the relationship of government to religious groups: 
 
a) at the individual level: the neutral (impartial) attitude of the state towards its 
citizens, who are free to profess the religion they prefer; 
 
b) at the collective level: there exist, within the public sector, domains where 
organizations can enjoy preferential treatment on the basis of their religious 
character. For example, most legal systems allow religious associations to use 
religious criteria in making employment decisions, even though in other 
circumstances discrimination on the basis of religion is forbidden; 
 
c) at both levels: the state has the right to interfere with religious organizations to 
the extent that their practices come into conflict with public order and to require 






associations, and–under parallel conditions–with the exercise of religion by 
individuals. 
 
The fundamental obligation of government in relation to religious organizations and 
individuals is one of neutrality. Thus the United States Supreme Court has forbidden 
government to engage in “viewpoint discrimination” against religious expression in 
circumstances in which secular expression is allowed, provided that government cannot 
be taken to be the sponsor of the religious expression. The most important cases in this 
domain have arisen within the context of public education at all levels. 
 
Three positions may be distinguished in the relationship between the secular State and 
religion: strict separation, strict neutrality, and positive neutrality; subsidiarity and 
sphere sovereignty are most consistent with the third. 
 
Strict separation seeks to exclude religious themes, motivations, and organizations from 
everything which government touches upon. Since government has extended its helping 
hand (or its grasp, if the reader prefers) into more and more spheres of social and cultural 
life over recent decades, the logic of strict separation is to drive religion into the corner of 
aspects of private life which have no public consequences.16 Underlying this objective, as 
reflected in the reasons advanced by many of its advocates, is a belief that religion is a 
dangerous and divisive force. Militant secular humanist Paul Blanshard wrote, 
approvingly, “Our schools may not teach Johnny to read properly, but the fact that Johnny 
is in school until he is sixteen tends toward the elimination of religious superstition.”17 
 
For some strict separationists, the solution is not so much a “naked public square” as one 
in which an alternative belief-system– “secularism” (laïcisme)–is established. A 
characteristic articulation of this goal is John Dewey’s little book A Common Faith (1934) 
or, more recently, Louis Legrand’s L’école unique: à quelles conditions? (1981) and Paul 
Kurtz’s Living Without Religion: Eupraxophy (1994). In contrast with Dewey, Kurtz 
takes pains to insist that humanism is not religious; the changing legal situation since 
Dewey’s proposal that schools teach a non- supernatural religion has given secularism the 
upper hand. Whereas for Dewey there were rhetorical and tactical advantages to claiming 
that his educational objectives were in some sense religious, there is now much more to 
be gained by claiming to be resolutely secular. 
 
Nevertheless, “secular perspectives and belief structures represent a point of view, a 
worldview as much as various religious perspectives and beliefs do.” Given the force and 
coherence of the secularist perspective, government policies which accord it a privileged 
position through funding institutions and programs which promote this perspective while 
handicapping faith-based perspectives by excluding them from the ever-enlarging sphere 
of government activity are scarcely neutral.18 
 
While it seeks to appear under the guise of neutrality, the strict separationist position is 
hostile to revealed religion, either intentionally or through lack of reflection. For example, 
it supports freedom of speech in public settings like schools, so long as the content of that 






position of censoring what teachers say in order to ensure that it remains safely secular. 
 
But exclusion of religious speech and motivations, of religious organizations and 
programs from equal participation in the “public square” and in public funding is not 
neutral in its effects. “If, to receive the normal benefits of public policies that similar, 
secularly-based organizations are receiving, a religious nonprofit organization must 
downplay or give up certain of its religious practices, public policy is interfering with its 
free exercise of religion.”19 
 
Strict neutrality, by contrast, insists that government should not be in the business of 
making distinctions between religious and secular speech and other activities, and should 
confine itself to ensuring that neutral rules are enforced upon each. Strict neutrality seeks 
not to influence either positively or negatively the choices that people make “for or against 
any particular religious or secular system of belief. It should neither  advantage  nor  
burden  religion.”20  A  government  committed to  strict  neutrality  would  fund  equally-
qualified  day-care  providers  or  youth programs without regard to their religious 
character, and would be concerned to be strictly fair by favoring neither religion nor 
secular ideologies . . . nor the lack of all convictions, though what this could mean in 
practice is hard to imagine! We could call this position “secularity,” in distinction from 
the secularism that lurks behind the strict separationist position. While secularism is an 
ideology which seeks to make converts, secularity is a posture that promises even-
handedness. 
 
Applying this principle consistently to education would require, as legal scholar Stephen 
Carter put it, that “if neutrality means that the government cannot take steps to treat 
religious schools better than other schools, it surely means as well that the government 
cannot take steps to treat religious schools worse.”21 
 
Positive neutrality takes the position that government should under some circumstances 
give its support to religious activities and motivations, when they serve a purpose whose 
benefits are primarily social rather than religious in nature and can do so especially well 
or in a way which responds to the desires and respects the consciences of those involved. 
There are, Monsma points out, a variety of public policy advantages to government 
partnership with faith-based organizations. “The first is that the government can make 
use of and build on the sense of dedication, empathy, and closeness to the people being 
served that tends to mark the workers in religiously based programs... A second 
advantage... is that religious associations have a basis on which to build a bond or sense 
of trust and to motivate persons with whom they are working that governmental and other 
secularly based agencies lack... A third advantage... is the flexibility thereby given public 
policy.”22 
 
In Germany the contribution of religion – or at least of the State-recognized Protestant 
and Catholic churches – is so highly valued that the government collects church taxes and 
gives preference to church-sponsored social welfare activities over its own in some cases, 
such as in the provision of kindergartens. The understanding behind such policies is that 






beings. The state should not favor any one religion or ideology, but it must make room for 
the religious, ideological nature of humankind” in the provisions that it makes for social 
welfare and education.23 
 
Although jurisprudence in the United States since World War II has tended–until recent 
years–to hold to a strict separationist position, it seems to have been the intention of the 
framers of the Bill of Rights (the first ten amendments to the Constitution) to establish 
positive neutrality toward religion, requiring government to act in such a way that it does 
not influence individuals or organizations to be or not to be religious. Reichley points out 
that “the First Amendment is no more neutral on the general value of religion than it is 
on the general value of the free exchange of ideas or an independent press.”24 
 
In fact, “the Free Exercise Clause, on its face, prefers religion, favoring it as no other 
activity is favored. There is no parallel constitutional protection for free exercise of 
tourism, boating, hiking, beer drinking, or environmentalism.... The Establishment 
Clause [as applied in a strict-separationist manner] may be seen as a discrimination 
against religion and a burden upon religion, and therefore, arguably, a Free Exercise 
Clause violation. There are no parallel clauses preventing the establishment of science, 
philosophy or speech.”25 
 
In the case of the Netherlands, the recent report of the Onderwijsraad seems to indicate 
a retreat from positive to strict neutrality, by recommending that parental choices 
motivated by religion no longer have a privileged status in comparison with those 
motivated by pedagogical and other concerns.26 
 
Positive neutrality rests upon a pluralist understanding of the political and social order 
which recognizes the important role of faith communities and associations alongside 
other forms of voluntary organization in maintaining society and in transmitting the 
habits and values which sustain it. A pluralist political order integrated such communities 
and associations “into the life of the body politic.” Neutrality toward religion is not, from 
this perspective, an end in itself but a means to ensure fair play among individuals and 
groups, whatever their views, so long as they abide by the ground rules which make society 
possible.27 
 
An underlying issue is what is meant by the neutrality of the state school. To employ the 
categories introduced above, strict separation would exclude all mention or 
acknowledgment of religion from state schools, strict neutrality would have the 
curriculum include, as appropriate, a neutral description of different religious traditions 
and their role in history and contemporary society, while positive neutrality would make 
room within the curriculum for the presentation of religious beliefs to willing participants 
as “assumptions that are, for the time being, unquestioned.”28 
 
There is yet another possibility, however: that the state school itself take on an ideological 
character, expressing and communicating a specific view of the world.29 Is it conceivable, 
in fact, that a real education, worthy of the name, could fail to be based upon, and to 






a vacuum of perspective and commitments, or is the reality that there is always a 
‘message” which is being communicated to pupils, even if it is a message of relativism and 
indifference, the “imposition of a specific form of materialism”?30 Is there not a danger 
that, as a thoroughly-secular legal scholar put it: 
 
the prevailing orthodoxy in most public schools is a negative one. There is order, 
but there is no community. Many schools are not simply moral vacuums, they are 
culturally confusing and devoid of significant shared values. . . . . For many 
students, acculturation in public schools is learning to abandon home or 
subculture values; to relate to others through roles and rules rather than as whole 
persons and community members; and to deny meanings, feelings, and intellect.31 
 
There have, of course, been periodic efforts to define a secular faith that could serve in 
place of traditional religion as the guiding principle of an education. In the United States, 
Horace Mann thought he could do that; so did John Dewey. Ferdinand Buisson in France, 
and more recently Louis Legrand sought to identify “a new unifying ethic, acceptable to 
all.”32 These efforts, it is fair to conclude, had only limited success when first made, and 
have even less credibility today. 
 
What has taken their place in elite discourse about education is the need to help pupils 
become autonomous, “reflective critical thinkers,” and this has become (often without 
much reflection) one of the assumptions of many teachers and those who train them. 
Making this a primary goal of a freely-chosen school is admirable; making it a public 
policy imposed on all schools and pupils is profoundly undemocratic. Political 
philosophers like Amy Gutmann, 
 
see the demands of civic virtue as requiring a form of autonomous deliberation 
about matters relating to the common good which include the capacity to evaluate 
values, commitments, and ways of life. Once developed, however, this capacity 
cannot be confined to the political realm and its development leads to a form of 
autonomy which is exercised across wider aspects of the life of the person, 
including those which fall into the “nonpublic” domain.33 
 
William Galston has provided an eloquent refutation, from a liberal perspective, of such 
liberal overreach. 
 
At the heart of much modern liberal democratic thought is a (sometimes tacit) 
commitment to the Socratic proposition that the unexamined life is an unworthy 
life, that individual freedom is incompatible with ways of life guided by 
unquestioned authority or unswerving faith. As philosophical conclusions, these 
commitments have much to recommend them. The question, though, is whether 
the liberal state is justified in building them into its system of public education. 
The answer is that it cannot do so without throwing its weight behind a conception 
of the human good unrelated to the functional needs of its sociopolitical 
institutions and at odds with the deep beliefs of many of its loyal citizens. As a 






examined lives–a right the effective exercise of which may require parental 
bulwarks against the corrosive influence of modernist skepticism.34 
 
As K. Anthony Appiah points out, the continued health of alternative frameworks of belief 
and life-orientation is essential if personal freedom itself is to be meaningful. 
 
We believe that children should be raised primarily in families and that those 
families should be able to shape their children into the culture, identity, and 
traditions that the adult members of the family take as their own. One liberal 
reason for believing this is that this is one way to guarantee the rich plurality of 
identities whose availability is, as I have said, one of the resources for self- 
construction. . . . But once we have left the raising of children to families, we are 
bound to acknowledge that parental love includes the desire to shape children into 
identities one cares about, and to teach them identity related values, in particular, 
along with the other ethical truths that the child will need to live her life well. A 
state that actively undermined parental choices in this regard in the name of the 
child’s future autonomy would be a state constantly at odds with the parents: and 
that would be unlikely to be good for the children.35 
 
Martha Nussbaum has reminded us recently that, in their exercise of freedom in post-
traditional societies like Western Europe and North America, “some people do actually 
choose lives involving authority and constraint.”36 Nor is this choice necessarily an 
indication of a lack of the moral courage which liberals claim to admire; this courage can 
be learned “from parents who set themselves against the dictates of popular culture” and 
thus in turn give youth “the emotional capacity necessary to act on concerns they may 
have about the life they are being raised to endorse.”37 According to Olivier Roy, what he 
calls “neo-fundamentalist Islam”– like evangelical Christianity–is by no means a passive 
acceptance of cultural traditions; it is, rather, a sphere where autonomy is exercised 
through  
 
the importance of self-achievement, attempts to reconstruct a religious community 
based on the individual commitment of the believers in a secular environment 
(hence the blossoming of sects), a personal quest for an immediately accessible 
knowledge in defiance of the established religious authority, the juxtaposition of a 
fundamentalist approach to the law (to obey God in every facet of one’s daily life) 
with syncretism and spiritual nomadism, the success of gurus and self-appointed 
religious leaders, and so on. Islam cannot escape the New Age of religions or 
choose the form of its own modernity.38 
 
In short, any attempt to promote a secular worldview based upon the ideal of 
unconstrained choice among values and life-direction is inconsistent with liberal 
democracy; it is a misguided effort “to protect the values associated with liberalism by 
being illiberal.”39 
 
Nor have attempts to take a comparative approach to teaching about religion in schools 






their own convictions. After all, “for religious adherents, multi-faith programs cannot 
help but trivialize religious commitments. Instead of treating them as serious life-
consuming commitments, ‘rival creeds are cast together in a common educational 
environment, and religious scruples and practices are celebrated as so many charming 
ornaments of ethnicity’.”40 As the chapter in this volume on government-prescribed 
values in curriculum points out, teaching about religion seems to have little effect on 
religious commitment. 
 
There has been a long history of controversy in Europe concerning the place of religion in 
schools. The right to participate in religious teaching is protected by Article 9 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR 1950) and by its Protocol 1(1952). The latter stipulates that “the State shall respect 
the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own 
religious and philosophical convictions.” These provisions were conceived initially as a 
shield for religious beliefs against totalitarian indoctrination of children by States in 
schooling and other education. The term “philosophical” was added, it seems, to include 
protection for the parental convictions of non-believing or agnostic parents. It may be 
deduced from Protocol 1(2), that where compulsory religious instruction is provided in 
State schools, parents must be permitted, if they so desire, to make alternative 
arrangements, a provision which is also part of explicit legislation. 
 
The common practice of subsidizing independent schools with a religious character does 
not absolve the State from the obligation to respect in its own schools the religious and 
philosophical convictions of parents. Although in the state schools the ‘transmission of 
ideas’ should take place in an ‘objective, critical, and pluralistic way’, this does not prevent 
the establishment of religious instruction as part of the program, In that case, however, 
an alternative choice must be offered to parents and pupils. The country profiles in 
volumes 2, 3, and 4 offer dozens of examples of different arrangements to provide 
religious instruction while respecting individual conscience. 
 
The problem of integrated religious instruction is mostly more complex in public 
secondary schools whose special religious character has been recognized in Canadian, 
New Zealand, English and Irish law. These schools strive, as part of their educational 
mission to convey a specific religious ethos to their pupils, who are enrolled voluntarily. 
However, the European Court of Human Rights has held that compulsory education in 
only one religion would violate Article 2 of the First Protocol to the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights. If these schools accept children of other faiths or 
none, they must implement a “conscience clause” allowing their withdrawal from 
religious instruction as is also required by several national laws. But the Kjelsden decision 
recognized the impossibility of a perfect separation of religious and philosophical and 
secular subjects: 
 
In fact, it seems very difficult for many subjects taught at school not to have, to a 
greater or lesser extent, some philosophical complexion or implications. The same 
is true of religious affinities if one remembers the existence of religions forming, a 






question of a philosophical, cosmological or moral nature.41 
 
What the ECHR and Protocol 1(2) appear to prohibit is the integration of religious and 
philosophical concepts in the secular curriculum of state schools to the extent that it 
amounts to an “aim of indoctrination.” Teachers must also refrain from “indoctrination” 
while teaching secular subjects. This seems to prohibit formal religious instruction during 
the secular curriculum but would not preclude some informal religious or philosophical 
concepts from impinging on secular education. 
 
The situation in the United States with respect to religion and public schools has been 
much less influenced by international law than has that in Europe. Dozens of decisions 
by the United States Supreme Court, and by lower federal and state courts, in recent 
decades have resulted in a tangle of legal precedents with little real consistency. Religion 
continues to be a source of conflict over American schools. Ironically, despite the 
relatively high level of religious practice compared with other Western democracies, the 
American public education system is less accommodating of religion than are its 
counterparts in most other countries. Religious instruction may not take place in public 
school buildings except under narrowly-defined circumstances in which an external 
organization rents the facility in the evening, and many public school teachers believe–
incorrectly–that they should not discuss religion in class or allow their pupils to do so. 
 
Nonpublic schools with a religious character in the United States were, until recently, 
denied public funding for their instructional programs. While services for small children 
and for adolescents, and university-level education receive public funding without 
discrimination based on the  religious  character  of the institutions that provide them, 
faith-based schools have been denied such assistance. This situation is changing in a 
kaleidoscope of state legislation and court decisions that either provide public funding in 
the form of vouchers for eligible families to use to pay tuition, or allow tax credits for those 
who contribute to programs that provide vouchers.42 See the supplemental chapter by 
Paul DiPerna in volume 3 for a summary as of August 2012. 
 
Challenges to such programs on the basis of state constitutional prohibitions against 
public funds supporting religious activities lead in turn to challenges of those prohibitions 
as arising out of discrimination on the basis of religion during a period of hostility to 
Catholic immigrants during the nineteenth century.43 
 
 
Is religion reviving? 
 
While conventional wisdom has it that Western societies have become less “religious” 
in recent decades, as measured by declining church attendance,44 there has also been 
a movement in the opposite direction, both in the form of rapidly-growing Islamic 
and Protestant Pentecostal movements45 and also in a diminution of the mutual 
mistrust between secular and religious leaders which marked much of the nineteenth 






phenomenon, seen in the explosive growth of Pentecostalism in Latin America, 
Africa, and Asia, and revivals–not to be confused with Islamism–in countries with a 
Muslim majority. “In the 1970s and 1980s, Muslim societies were swept by a 
resurgence of personal piety and public observance. Attendance at Friday mosque 
services swelled . . . women donned head coverings (hijab) and men sported facial 
hair.”47 Olivier Roy describes “the sudden emergence in all Western monotheistic 
religions of new forms of religiosity, all of them communitarian (but of a purely 
religious community), exclusive (a clear dividing line separates the saved from the 
damned), and inclusive (all aspects of life must be placed by the believer under the 
aegis of religion).”48 
 
What is emerging in Western Europe at present, because of the growing visibility and 
activity of Islam, is a renewed focus on religion as an issue for educational systems. 
In the United States, by contrast, conflicts over the accommodation of religion in 
public schools and over whether non-public schools with a religious character can 
benefit from public funding have been constant since the 1950s. It is more true than 
ever that there is “a notable similarity between Europe and the United States: 
educational institutions serve as a major battlefield for the negotiation of religious 
differences.”49 
 
What is interesting about this similarity is that it exists despite a very different 
relationship with Islam. “Islam has quickly become a part of the accommodating 
religious landscape in the USA, and Muslims were added to the already-existing 
‘rainbow-coalition’ of religions. In Europe, religious pluralism is a new social fact that 
yet has to be fitted into legal frameworks and public practices.”50 In fact, Muslim 
Americans are remarkably like other Americans of other religious traditions: 
 
By a margin of nearly two to one (63 to 32 percent) they saw no conflict 
between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society. . . . American 
Muslims are a little more likely than Christians to say religion is “very 
important” in their lives (72 versus 60 percent). But they are a little less likely 
to say that they pray every day (61 versus 70 percent). The two communities 
are about equally likely to attend religious services at least once a week (40 
percent of Muslims versus 45 percent of Christians). Muslims are thus 
mainstream members of a pluralist religious society.51 
 
An important factor is that Muslim Americans are successfully integrated in 
American society with respect to education, income, and other factors; many in fact 
came as graduate students or professionals, rather than as manual laborers as was 
the case in Europe. In addition, however, they came to a society that takes religious 
belief and practice as normal, even reassuring, rather than as a source of alienation 
from societal norms. 
 
The conflict over religion and education in the United States, then, does not in most 
cases have to do with Islam but with religiously-conservative Catholics and 






presentations that are offensive to their beliefs. 
 
The situation of culture and religion, especially in Western Europe, has undergone 
significant changes over the past two decades, as the generation of immigrants tied 
to their cultures of origin is replaced by their children and grandchildren, who do not 
necessarily identify with that culture or speak the language associated with it. For 
many of the second and third generations, forms of trans-cultural religious belief and 
practice (what Olivier Roy calls neo-fundamentalist Islam in Europe, Pentecostalism 
in North America and elsewhere) create new identities that cannot be addressed by 
any sort of multicultural curriculum. 
 
The neo-fundamentalist enterprise, by defining the community of believers not 
in sociological and cultural terms but as a voluntary association, has de facto 
constructed a space “other” than that of the surrounding society, thereby 
separating the religious from the social. The rule applies to only the believer.... 
The believer lives his religion in a space shared with the nonbeliever, but he 
inhabits that space in a different way.52 
 
Among both evangelical Protestants in the United States, Canada, and England, and 
Muslims in both Europe and North America there is a significant (though probably 
not a majority) interest in faith-based schools, and demands, as a matter of equity, 
for public funding of such schools. This reflects dissatisfaction not only with the 
secular message delivered by public schools, but also with the various efforts to 
provide teaching about religion within those schools. Spokesmen commonly insist –
as Catholic school advocates have long insisted–that religion should be not a 
curriculum topic but the underlying ethos of a school. 
 
One sign of the new self-confidence of Muslims in Western Europe is the demand for 
Islamic schools, which has been accommodated with public funding in the 
Netherlands, England and other countries where there is already provision of schools 
of other religious traditions. These schools have been funded on the basis of religious 
freedom, rather than of ethnic separatism. Despite the reluctance of Dutch 
authorities, a publicly-funded Islamic school was able to get off the ground with a 
hundred pupils in late 1988. The leaders insisted that it was “a Dutch elementary 
school on an Islamic basis,” and noted that all five teachers were Dutch, 
supplemented by a Moroccan and a Turkish teacher to provide supplemental 
language and culture lessons. The lesson plan was that of other Dutch schools, except 
that the required periods of religious (or humanistic) instruction were devoted to 
Islam. Dutch was the language of instruction except for the periods of religion and of 
supplemental language and culture. The Moroccan chairman of the school’s trustees 
pointed out that non-Muslim pupils were welcome and would be treated with the 
same respect that Muslim pupils have experienced in Catholic and Protestant schools; 
apparently no irony was intended. 
 
In 1988 the Islamitic Foundation for Education in The Netherlands (ISNO) was 






in Amsterdam, The Hague and Rotterdam. The chairman said “our children will 
become more Dutch all the time, but they need to know where they stand, they need 
to have their own zuil [sector of society] and not be counted in with the Catholics or 
Protestants.” Another board member said, “It is precisely our policy to make sure that 
our children can make good progress in the society right away. We are trying to 
convey Islam in a Dutch form.”53 
 
About fifty Islamic schools are functioning at present in the Netherlands and, despite 
serious concerns about the quality of the instruction and management of some,54 
there is no evidence that they are tending to alienate their pupils from Dutch society. 
 
In the United States, there are about two hundred Islamic schools, none of which 
receive public funding. 
 
Whether or not public funding is provided, government oversight must balance 
between the need to avoid promotion of racial segregation and the desire to 
encourage initiatives by minority communities. In practice, institutional autonomy 
must be seen as a condition which is capable of being modified, redefined and having 
new requirements enforced as a price of its continuation. It is conditioned by the 
principles of accountability, performance assessment, and financial audit. 
 
The emergence of new religiously-separate schools is a considerable shock for those 
secularists who had confidently assumed that they were a phenomenon of a less 
enlightened age and would soon pass from the scene. A thoughtful account of the new 
political activism of Muslims in Western Europe notes how “European debates revert 
to the same syllogism, again and again. If they have not abandoned their faith, 
Muslims are religious fundamentalists. Since choice is meaningless among 
fundamentalists, only victims or bullies are Muslims.”55 This is clearly not an 
appropriate basis for respect toward or the integration into European society of 
millions of individuals of the second and third generations deriving from immigration 
whose primary identity is not as Moroccans or Turks but as Muslims, whether they 
attend the mosque or not.56 
 
Legitimate concerns are expressed about whether religiously-separate schools will 
prevent integration into the host society; this is precisely the charge that was brought 
against Catholic schools in the United States during the nineteenth century, only to 
be disproved by the salient role that such schools played in the transition of language, 
culture, and loyalty. Of course one cannot guarantee that the same process will occur 
with Islamic schools in Western societies, but there is no intrinsic reason to believe 
that it will not. After all, most Muslim parents want their children to learn what they 
need to be successful in the host society, without surrendering to aspects of popular 
culture that they find offensive . . . and who can say that they are wrong? 
 
Christopher Shannon has pointed out that the “path to meaningful diversity lies not 
in the refinement of abstract, neutral, universal principles that affirm the dignity of 






in very particular faith and value systems.... The public school system remains in the 
vanguard of promoting false universalisms.” The goal of secular liberalism was to 
segregate religion into the private sphere, a sphere which shrinks all the time as 
government takes on more and more functions previously carried out by families and 
voluntary associations, including religious communities. But it can be argued that the 
 
alternative to the present segregation of religion is not integration but 
separation. Such separation marks a retreat only from the Enlightenment 
ideology of liberal universalism, not from participation in the political 
institutions that are, admittedly, the legacy of this ideology. . . . The fostering 
of local institutions, rooted in distinct, particular traditions, promises the most 
meaningful alternative to both the religious intolerance of the past and the 
secular intolerance of the present.57 
 
Policy-makers are challenged with finding the right balance between respecting the 
right of voluntary communities formed around shared religious convictions to 
nurture their children in those convictions, and ensuring that those children grow 
into citizens capable of functioning cooperating and deliberating with fellow-citizens 
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